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The Quantum Doomsday Argument 
Alastair Wilson1 
December 23rd, 2014 
Abstract: If the most familiar overlapping interpretation of Everettian 
quantum mechanics (EQM) is correct, then we are constantly splitting into 
multiple people. This consequence gives rise to the quantum doomsday 
argument, which threatens to draw crippling epistemic consequences from 
EQM. However, a diverging (ʻparallel universeʼ) interpretation of EQM 
undermines the quantum doomsday argument completely. This appears to 
tell in favour of the diverging interpretation. But it is surprising that a 
metaphysical question that is apparently underdetermined by the physics 
should be settled by purely epistemological considerations; and I argue that 
the argument for divergence based on the quantum doomsday effect is 
ultimately unsuccessful. I discuss how some influential treatments of 
Everettian confirmation handle the quantum doomsday puzzle, and suggest 
that it can most satisfyingly be resolved via a naturalistic approach to the 
metaphysics of modality. 
1. Introduction 
2. The doomsday argument 
3. The quantum doomsday argument 
4. Doomsday and divergence 
5. Solutions to the quantitative problem 
6. Many worlds and modal realism 
7. Conclusion 
1. Introduction 
Realists of various stripes about possible worlds face the question of 
whether to adopt a diverging or an overlapping form of realism. (Overlapping 
worlds have parts in common; diverging worlds do not.) A case of special interest 
is Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM), also known as the ‘Many-Worlds 
Interpretation’2. Since it is a live empirical possibility that EQM is correct, it is 
important to understand its metaphysical implications. 
                                     
1 Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK; Philosophy, 
Monash University, Victoria 3800, Australia. 
2 For an introduction to this approach to quantum mechanics, see Wallace (2012). 
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Elsewhere I have given arguments, based on metaphysical and semantic 
considerations, for a diverging understanding of EQM. In this paper I will explore 
- and ultimately reject - an alternative epistemological argument for divergence. 
In brief, the argument is that more familiar overlapping form of EQM gives rise to 
a quantum-mechanical version of the doomsday effect. This threatens overlapping 
EQM with crippling epistemic consequences: if we come to accept overlapping 
EQM, we should become almost certain that we will have no future experience 
whatsoever. 
I won’t assess the original doomsday argument directly in this paper, 
though in §2 I quickly sketch it, classifying responses into two categories. In §3 I 
present the quantum doomsday argument, and show how it threatens overlapping 
EQM with what Barrett (1999) has called ‘empirical incoherence’. Strikingly, the 
diverging version of EQM defended by Saunders (2010) and by Wilson (2012) 
completely undermines the quantum doomsday argument (§4). If diverging EQM 
is correct, then ceteris paribus there are just as many early temporal parts of a 
given person as there are late temporal parts. This can be turned into a dilemma 
for overlap: either it leads to absurd doomsday consequences, or it is 
automatically disconfirmed. Either way, divergence is the preferable hypothesis. 
At this point we might reasonably suspect that something has gone 
wrong. What looked like a purely metaphysical question has turned out to have 
radical epistemological consequences. In §5 I explain how some prominent 
treatments of probability in EQM handle the puzzle. The problem of avoiding a 
quantum doomsday effect is a special case of the so-called quantitative problem 
with probability in EQM: the problem of explaining why objective probabilities 
are to be given by the Born rule. A variety of proposals exist for solving the 
quantitative problem, and they all clash with the indifference principle that drives 
the quantum doomsday argument. If these solutions can be sustained, the 
quantum doomsday argument is solved en passant.   
Nonetheless, the indifference principle used in the quantum doomsday 
argument remains prima facie plausible; and treatments of Everettian probability 
which conflict with it have some explaining to do. Why is indifference reasoning 
about self-location appropriate in non-Everettian contexts but inappropriate in 
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Everettian contexts? In §6 I describe and defend a resolution to the puzzle, which 
makes use of a naturalistic approach to the metaphysics of modality and points 
towards a quantum-mechanical version of modal realism. 
2. The doomsday argument 
The original doomsday argument is a puzzle about self-locating belief. A 
curiosity of probability theory, it has been independently identified several times 
over. Perhaps the most well-known sources are (Carter 1983), Gott (1993), and 
Leslie (1989)3. Driving the argument is the idea that the evidence which we have 
of our birth rank – of the number of humans born before us – confirms the 
hypothesis that the total population of humans will not be very much greater 
than the total to have lived up to the present moment4.  
By itself, the purported probabilistic connection between our birth rank 
and the end of the human species does not establish that doomsday will come 
soon. To secure that gloomy conclusion, we need also to take into account the 
rapid recent rise in human population. If the population remains around current 
levels for at least another few millennia, then you and I will turn out to have lived 
surprisingly early in the history of humanity. Familiar Bayesian reasoning takes 
the unlikelihood of some evidence on a hypothesis to tell against the hypothesis. 
Accordingly, our now5 being alive comprises evidence against the hypothesis that 
the population will remain around current levels for at least another few 
millennia. Informally: if doom lies in the distant future, then we’re living 
                                     
3 There are a number of distinct versions of the Doomsday argument. The version given 
by Gott (1993) requires no assumptions about the distribution of humans throughout 
human history, and accordingly has less dramatic consequences then the version given by 
Leslie (1989), which takes into account the recent dramatic rise in human population. 
Sober (2002) refers to these arguments as ‘Gott’s line’ and ‘Leslie’s wedge’ respectively. 
The connection with EQM that is drawn in the present paper involves Leslie’s version of 
the argument.  (See also Bradley and Fitelson 2003 for further distinctions amongst 
versions of the argument.) 
4 It has sometimes been suggested (e.g. by Monton 2003) that the doomsday argument 
can be run without the need for knowledge of birth rank. In my view, Bradley (2005) 
convincingly argues that Monton’s argument neglects observation selection effects, and that 
knowledge of birth rank is required for a doomsday effect after all. 
5 Throughout this paper, ‘now’ is intended to refer rigidly; substitute a date if you prefer. 
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unusually early, but if doom will be within the next few hundred years, then we’re 
not living unusually early.  
It will be helpful to see how this plays out in a toy example. To simplify 
matters, let’s assume that only two scenarios are epistemic possibilities for us 
(numbers are chosen arbitrarily): 
 
Fig 1.  Doom Soon: Total population will be twice the total to now. 
 
 
Fig 2.  Doom Later: Total population will be ten times the total to now. 
Evidence about birth rank is evidence about the number of people who have have 
lived before you. To make sense of what it would be to obtain such evidence, we 
can consider a scenario (perhaps involving amnesia) in which someone is 
completely certain that the DoomSoon scenario (timelessly) obtains but is 
completely uncertain of the current date. They have the information provided by 
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Figure 1, but without the now marker. For all they know, they could be the very 
first person to live, or the very last6. How should they distribute their credences 
amongst the various locations they might occupy? 
A popular answer to this question (defended by Adam Elga, amongst 
others) appeals to a restricted principle of indifference: 
Restricted principle of indifference: credence should be evenly 
distributed amongst similar centred worlds: subjectively indistinguishable 
locations within a single possible world. (Elga 2000, 2004.) 
The arguments that follow don’t in fact need the full strength of this indifference 
principle. Any remotely plausible rule for distributing credence amongst locations 
will lead to doomsday effect of the sort that I’ll describe7. For ease of 
presentation, though, I’ll work with Elga’s principle for the next few sections. 
Granting the restricted principle of indifference, an agent who knows only 
that either DoomSoon or DoomLater obtains, and is ignorant of their own birth 
rank, should have the following conditional credences: 
P(LiveByNow|DoomSoon) = 1/2 
P(LiveByNow|DoomLater) = 1/10 
P(LiveByNow|DoomSoon) > P(LiveByNow|DoomLater) 
Since weʼre assuming that either DoomSoon or DoomLater is true, if LiveByNow 
confirms DoomSoon over DoomLater then it confirms DoomSoon over its 
negation. So conditionalizing on LiveByNow increases credence in DoomSoon: 
P(DoomSoon|LiveByNow) > P(DoomSoon) 
Thus, in this simplified setup, a doomsday shift arises merely from the discovery 
that we are alive now.  
There are two alternative ways of escaping the doomsday conclusion: 
rejecting the existence of a doomsday shift, or adjusting priors to compensate for 
                                     
6 This assumption makes the maths simplest; but of course it isn’t necessary for the 
effect. All that’s required for some degree of doomsday-related change in credence is that 
the agent shouldn’t start off certain of their birth rank. 
7 See Bradley & Fitelson (2003) for a defence of this claim. 
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it. The former strategy involves some fairly radical moves: for example, giving up 
some aspect of probabilism, or denying that birth rank is contingent. I find 
responses of this sort implausible, and I wonʼt discuss them further8. A more 
interesting strategy involves the ‘Self-Indication Assumption’: 
Self-Indication Assumption (SIA): The prior probability of a world w 
should be weighted by the number of agents who exist at w. (Bostrom 
2002) 
SIA expresses the thought that our own existence is more likely in a populous 
world. Heuristically: such worlds contain more ‘slots’ that we could have been 
born into. Applying SIA to our doomsday scenario: 
P(LiveAtAll|DoomLater) = 5 * P(LiveAtAll|DoomSoon) 
This effect exactly cancels the doomsday shift (see e.g. Bartha & Hitchcock 1999). 
But SIA is controversial, and most epistemologists reject it. Bostrom’s 
‘presumptious philosopher’ objection (Bostrom 2002) elicits strong intuitions that 
SIA ought not to decide between cosmological theories that differ only in their 
predictions for the size of the universe. I will return to SIA in §4. 
The doomsday argument comes in both ‘personal’ and ‘social’ versions. 
Instead of considering the birth rank of some person - how far through human 
history theyʼre located - we can consider the birth distance of some person-stage - 
how far the stage is through the life of the person of whom itʼs a stage. Then 
instead of raising the probability for the imminent end of the human race, the 
doomsday effect raises the probability for the imminent death of the person 
concerned. The personal version of the argument lacks the full force of the social 
version because (so we normally think) person-stages arenʼt sparser at the 
beginning of a life in the way that people were sparser early in human history.  
                                     
8 Responses of these sort are given by Benétreau-Dupin (forthcoming) and Greenberg 
(1999) respectively. 
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3. The quantum doomsday argument 
Darren Bradley has recently remarked9 that there is no analogue of the 
doomsday argument in the context of Everettian quantum mechanics. This is 
incorrect.  On the standard overlapping interpretation of EQM, worlds are 
constantly branching: that is, literally splitting into multiple copies of themselves. 
The corresponding re-fusion is suppressed by the temporally asymmetric process 
of decoherence, which produces branching of worlds towards the future but no 
branching towards the past10. This temporal asymmetry of decoherence leads to a 
disparity in the number of branches, or Everett worlds11, between early times and 
later times. Most world-stages are closer to the end of the world of which they’re 
a part than to its beginning. There is a corresponding disparity in the number of 
inhabitants of worlds between early times and later times. Most agents are closer 
to the end of the population of which they’re a part than to its beginning. 
The quantum doomsday argument proceeds exactly on the model of the 
original doomsday argument. We can consider analogous population scenarios: 
 
Fig 3.  Branching Doom Soon:  Total population will be just over twice the total to 
now. 
                                     
9 Bradley (2011), p.15. 
10 The ultimate source of the temporal asymmetry of decoherence presumably lies in a 
low-entanglement initial quantum state of the universe. This will not matter for our 
purposes. 
11 I use these terms interchangeably, in the spirit of the ‘many worlds interpretation’. 
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Fig 4.  Branching Doom Later: Total population will be just over seven times the 
total to now. 
 
The evidence that you have lived before the present confirms Branching 
Doom Soon over Branching Doom Later. That is, conditionalizing on the truth of 
EQM under a branching interpretation greatly increases the size of the doomsday 
shift. I will refer to this magnified doomsday shift as the ‘quantum doomsday 
shift’. In our simplified setup, a quantum doomsday shift arises merely from the 
discovery that we are alive now: 
P(LiveByNow|BranchingDoomSoon) ≈ 1/2 
P(LiveByNow|BranchingDoomLater) ≈ 1/7 
 
The more branching, the larger the quantum doomsday shift. Since 
branch number grows exponentially, the size of the shift is gigantic. For example, 
if every branch splits into two once per second, the number of branches is 2n after 
n seconds. If the branching is into more than two branches, the disparity becomes 
even more striking, since branch number grows exponentially. In the bifurcating 
case, after n seconds the number of branch-temporal-parts in existence, 2n, is 
greater than the total number to have existed up to that point (2n - 1). And if t2 is 
10 branching-events after t1, then there are 2
10 more branches at t2 than there are 
at t1. 
Moreover, branching is utterly ubiquitous. Decoherence occurs on 
timescales of 10-20 seconds: and the branching is into countless branches. (Even if 
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branch number is in some sense or other indeterminate, itʼs determinately 
gigantic; see §5 for further discussion.) So the quantum doomsday shift is going to 
be overwhelmingly larger in size than the ordinary doomsday shift. 
The original doomsday argument runs as follows. Traditional estimates of 
the likely end of human civilization neglect the doomsday shift; but the doomsday 
shift is an unavoidable consequence of probability theory combined with empirical 
facts concerning population distribution; so traditional estimates of the likely end 
of human civilization are far too optimistic. We can construct a parallel quantum 
doomsday argument as follows. Previous estimates of the likely end of human 
civilization – even those which take into account the doomsday shift – neglect the 
quantum doomsday shift; but the quantum doomsday shift is an unavoidable 
consequence of probability theory combined with the hypothesis that EQM is 
correct; so, if EQM is correct, then previous estimates of the likely end of human 
civilization – even those which take into account the doomsday shift – are far too 
optimistic. 
As with the original doomsday argument, the quantum doomsday 
argument comes in a personal version as well as a social version. The social 
version of the quantum doomsday argument considers birth rank of persons: the 
personal version considers ‘life rank’ of person-stages. Taking into account the 
rapid timescale of decoherence, the social version of the argument concludes that 
we should expect society to end almost immediately and the personal version 
concludes that we should expect our own lives to end almost immediately. 
Needless to say, neither of these conclusions is palatable.  
A few quick clarifications and caveats: 
i) Contemporary Everettians often deny that branch number is meaningful 
or well-defined. We will return to this point in §5, but for the sake of the 
argument I will assume that we can make sense of branch number. 
ii) I am assuming that there is no ʻquantum suicideʼ effect leading a subject 
to expect only survival when facing a risky upcoming quantum event. In 
my view, Papineau (2003) persuasively undermines the argument for this 
effect; see also Wallace (2012) §10.2.2. 
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iii) Since EQM is deterministic at the fundamental level, an agent who knows 
the whole quantum state can in principle know all the facts about the 
future evolution of the entire multiverse. The quantum doomsday 
argument does not apply to such agents, just as the regular doomsday 
argument does not apply to agents who know when doom will come. 
The quantum doomsday argument shows that the hypothesis that EQM 
is correct has radical and deeply unpalatable epistemic consequences. So, how 
should a defender of overlapping EQM respond to the quantum doomsday 
argument? One obvious option is to adopt the self-indication assumption. As 
described in §2 above, prior credences that are in accordance with SIA can be 
used to cancel the doomsday effect; and this applies to the quantum doomsday 
effect just as it applies to the original doomsday effect. More populous multiverses 
are a priori more likely than less populous ones, according to their relative 
populations; allowing both for SIA and for a quantum doomsday shift leaves 
credences back where they started. 
However, there are a number of reasons to be unhappy with the resulting 
theoretical position. Firstly, SIA suffers from objections like Bostrom’s 
ʻpresumptious philosopherʼ: the number of observers predicted just doesn’t seem 
epistemically relevant to theory-choice in the way that SIA specifies. Secondly, 
the position threatens to lead to problematic ‘automatic’ confirmation of many-
world theories such as EQM over single-world theories such as Bohmian 
mechanics. (After all, multiverses are vastly more populous than individual 
universes.) Thirdly, the position leads to disaster in light of the availability of a 
non-overlapping interpretation of EQM. That is the topic of the next section. 
4. Doomsday and divergence 
Recent work on the metaphysics of EQM (Saunders 2010, Wilson 2012) 
has applied David Lewisʼ distinction (Lewis 1986) between divergence and 
overlap. The usual interpretation of the decoherent histories formalism has it 
representing an ontology according to which histories have initial segments in 
common. But the formalism can equally be interpreted as representing a set of 
histories that are mereologically distinct from one another. Pictorially: 
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Fig 5.  Overlap & divergence 
 
For Saunders and Wilson, making sense of future-directed probabilities is 
the main motivation for a diverging understanding of EQM. Divergence allows for 
a simple bivalent semantics that can apply to both past-directed and future-
directed thought and talk. It does so by providing a self-locating, or indexical, 
content for all contingent propositions, including those about the future. (See 
Saunders 2010, Wilson 2012, 2013.) David Deutsch also endorses an approach 
(‘fungible worlds’) that is closely related to divergence (Deutsch 2011); and 
influential recent work by Anthony Aguirre and Max Tegmark (Aguirre & 
Tegmark 2011) presupposes a diverging picture12. 
What I think is striking is that the diverging version of EQM completely 
undermines the quantum doomsday argument. (I will focus on the personal 
version of the argument; the same point applies to the social version.) If diverging 
EQM is correct, then there are just as many early temporal parts of a given 
person as there are late temporal parts: 
 
Fig 6.  Populations given overlap & given divergence. 
                                     
12 Anthony Aguirre has confirmed (p.c.) that the proposal in Aguirre & Tegmark (2011) 
is intended to be understood on the model of divergence. 
12 
 
The quantum doomsday argument applies to overlapping EQM, but not to 
diverging EQM. Hence a differential overall doomsday effect arises: we ought to 
expect to live much longer under the diverging version of EQM than we would 
expect to live under the overlapping version of EQM. 
This is all rather puzzling; and the puzzle can be sharpened into a 
troubling dilemma for the friend of overlap. According to overlapping EQM, there 
are vastly fewer people in existence than there are according to diverging EQM. 
SIA instructs us to weight the prior probability of a hypothesis by the number of 
people whose existence it entails. Accordingly: 
Horn 1: If SIA is correct, diverging EQM has a much greater prior 
probability than overlapping EQM. 
However, avoiding this horn by rejecting SIA leaves us facing the quantum 
doomsday effect. Overlapping EQM leads to a runaway increase in the number of 
worlds over time, while diverging EQM does not. This increase in the number of 
worlds gives rise to the quantum doomsday effect. 
Horn 2: If SIA is incorrect, overlapping EQM leads to an overwhelming 
quantum doomsday effect, while diverging EQM does not. 
It seems safe to assume that generating an overwhelming quantum doomsday 
effect makes an overlapping version of EQM untenable (horn 2). But avoiding the 
quantum doomsday effect by appeal to SIA leads us to give divergence much 
greater prior probability than we give overlap (horn 1). So overlapping EQM faces 
a serious dilemma. Whether or not SIA is correct, overlap is untenable and 
divergence is the only viable metaphysic for EQM. 
The contrast between overlap and divergence looks paradigmatically 
metaphysical; indeed, Wallace is sceptical of the coherence of the distinction on 
this very basis. It is therefore rather surprising that it should have the dramatic 
epistemic consequences highlighted by the dilemma just presented. These 
consequences cast doubt on Wallace’s claim that the distinction is ‘fairly 
contentless’ (Wallace 2012 p.287): if the reasoning above can be sustained, then 
divergence and overlap appear to give very different verdicts about the rational 
epistemic state of an agent who comes to believe EQM. 
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The relation between metaphysics and epistemology is subtle and 
complex, and we should expect there to be some epistemological constraints on 
physical theories. But the dilemma for overlap arising from the quantum 
doomsday effect really does look suspiciously quick: the falsity of a metaphysical 
doctrine like overlap should not be derivable simply from structural features of 
our confirmation theory. And in fact, the reasoning is too quick; there is no easy 
route to divergence from consideration of the quantum doomsday effect. 
Understanding why will require a more detailed look at Everettian probability. 
Authors including David Deutsch, David Wallace, Simon Saunders and 
Hilary Greaves have recently developed complex and sophisticated treatments of 
probability in EQM. In the next section (§5), I’ll explain how these authors 
handle problems like the quantum doomsday argument independently of the 
question of divergence vs. overlap by providing an Everettian-friendly decision-
theoretic framework. Such treatments do not permit indifference reasoning to be 
applied across Everett worlds in such a way as to generate a quantum doomsday 
effect, so the argument for divergence based on the quantum doomsday effect 
lapses. However, the justification for restricting indifference reasoning in this way 
remains controversial. In §6, I’ll describe a novel approach that provides a clear 
rationale for the needed restriction on the principle of indifference. The key move 
is to adopt a naturalistic metaphysics of modality, construing EQM as a form of 
modal realism. 
5. Solutions to the quantitative problem 
Probability has frequently been targeted by critics of EQM. The 
‘probability problem’ for Everettians can be divided into three sub-problems: 
• The Incoherence Problem:  How does probability even make sense in a 
multiverse theory like EQM? – what are the probabilities probabilities of ? 
• The Quantitative Problem:  Given EQM, why should probabilities of 
outcomes be given by the Born Rule? 
• The Epistemic Problem:  Given EQM, how does our ordinary statistical 
evidence count as evidence in favour of EQM? 
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The problems are not independent; for example, a solution to the incoherence 
problem is arguably a precondition for a solution to the quantitative problem and 
a solution to the quantitative problem is arguably a precondition for a solution to 
the epistemic problem. But for present purposes we can focus on the quantitative 
problem. A solution to the quantitative problem would suffice to dissolve the 
argument for divergence based on the quantum doomsday effect, since the Born 
Rule probabilities – or branch weights – incorporate no quantum doomsday effect. 
A number of solutions to the quantitative problem have been proposed. 
Everett himself gave frequentist-style arguments for the Born Rule, and appealed 
to symmetry properties of the quantum state; other solutions have proceeded via 
invoking additional physical structure (Deutsch 1985; Albert & Loewer 1988), via 
a direct theoretical identification of branch weights with objective probabilities 
(Saunders 1998), or via decision theory. I will focus on the decision-theoretic 
approaches, as they have been the subject of vigorous recent discussion.  
Decision-theoretic solutions to the quantitative problem derive originally 
from pioneering work by Deutsch (1999). Over the next decade these arguments 
were refined and strengthened, resulting in the systematic decision-theoretic 
treatments of Everettian probability given by Wallace (2003, 2006, 2007, 2010, 
2012), Saunders (2005), Greaves (2004, 2007) and Greaves and Myrvold (2010). 
These authors (henceforth: WSGM) offer and defend sets of decision-theoretic 
axioms which give rise to decision theories appropriate to Everettian agents. In 
these decision theories, branch weights play the functional role of objective 
chances. The WSGM decision-theoretic treatments entail that rational epistemic 
agents should set their prior credences (conditional on the truth of EQM) in being 
located in a given Everett world equal to the branch weight of that world – an 
Everettian form of what David Lewis called the Principal Principle13.  
 The WSGM decision-theoretic treatments differ in a number of details, 
but they all incorporate restrictions on what a rational agent can in principle 
define their preferences over. To adapt terminology from Savage, the WSGM 
treatments identify the decision-theoretic state with individual Everett worlds 
                                     
13 See Lewis (1980/1986). 
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rather than with entire multiverses14. The decision-theoretic state is ordinarily 
thought of as representing the agent and the whole of their environment: every 
decision the agent makes is rationally assessable only with respect to the 
consequences the decision has for the agent’s decision-theoretic state. 
The kind of self-locating uncertainty which drives the quantum doomsday 
argument is uncertainty about where in a branching multiverse one is located. 
Uncertainty of this sort incorporates both uncertainty about which Everett world 
the agent is in and uncertainty about which centre an agent occupies within their 
Everett world. This distinction matters a great deal, because WSGM handle these 
latter two kinds of uncertainty very differently. Uncertainty about which Everett 
world an agent is in is uncertainty about what their decision-theoretic state is 
like. Uncertainty about which centre an agent occupies within an Everett world 
remains even when the agent’s decision-theoretic state is fully specified. As they 
have been developed thus far, the WSGM treatments do not take account of the 
possibility of self-locating uncertainty within a single Everett world, but any 
extension of the treatments to account for this possibility is constrained by the 
need to assign credences to Everett worlds according to the Born rule. 
Through their identification of decision-theoretic states with Everett 
worlds, the WSGM decision-theoretic treatments effectively factor uncertainty 
about self-location within a branching multiverse into two components: self-
locating uncertainty within a single Everett world, and uncertainty about which 
Everett world one is in. The treatments impose the following constraint (which 
corresponds to the Born rule) on credences about which Everett world one is in: 
these credences, conditional on the truth of EQM, should match the weights 
assigned to each Everett world. However, they place no special constraints on self-
locating uncertainty within a single Everett world. Consequently, the WSGM 
treatments leave open the possibility of applying something like Elgaʼs restricted 
indifference principle within any specific Everett world, but they rule out the 
possibility of applying it across Everett worlds. While indifference reasoning turns 
                                     
14 This move is made, more or less explicitly, by Wallace (e.g. Wallace 2012 p.163-166), 
by Saunders (Saunders 2005 p. 229-230), by Greaves (Greaves 2007 p.128-9) and by 
Greaves & Myrvold (2010 p.296-8). See also (Greaves 2007 p.147). 
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on relative numbers of outcomes, branch weights are insensitive to fine-grainings 
of the history space, which means that altering the number of worlds on which an 
outcome occurs will not affect the probability of that outcome15. 
In the WSGM decision-theoretic frameworks the indifference principles 
driving the quantum doomsday argument cannot be applied across different 
branches of the multiverse, so the argument for the quantum doomsday shift 
breaks down. Since the WSGM decision theoretic treatments are neutral between 
divergence and overlap, this response to the quantum doomsday argument 
dissolves the dilemma of §4. Meanwhile, the original doomsday argument is 
unaffected. That argument, transposed to the Everettian setting, involves only 
self-locating uncertainty within a single Everett world, so the indifference 
principle that it involves does not clash with the Born rule. Nothing in the 
WSGM decision-theoretic treatments undermines Elga-style indifference reasoning 
when it is confined only to in-branch applications.  
These results generalize beyond decision-theoretic solutions to the 
quantitative problem. Setting credences about which Everett world one is in 
according to the Born Rule is incompatible with respecting the indifference 
principle that drives the quantum doomsday argument. Accordingly, if any 
Everettian solution to the quantitative problem can be sustained, then the 
indifference principle driving the quantum doomsday effect is false and the 
argument for divergence based on the quantum doomsday shift is unsound. If no 
Everettian solution to the quantitative problem can be sustained, then EQM is in 
any case untenable. So the quantum doomsday effect cannot after all provide 
good grounds for adopting diverging EQM.  
Two problems remain. How can Everettians explain away the apparent 
plausibility of the indifference reasoning that drives the quantum doomsday 
argument? And how can they justify continuing to apply indifference reasoning in 
the more familiar contexts that initially motivated Elga’s restricted principle of 
indifference? These questions will be addressed in the next section. 
                                     
15 This holds true as long as the relevant decoherence conditions are satisfied; see Wallace 
(2012) §4.3. 
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6. Many worlds and modal realism 
When doing decision theory in the classical one-world setting, in order to 
adequately account for self-locating uncertainty we need to treat the question of 
where in the world we are differently from the question of what the world is like. 
Likewise, if EQM is correct, in order to adequately account for self-locating 
uncertainty we need to treat the question of which Everett world we’re in 
differently from the question of where we are in that Everett world. §5 showed 
that we can achieve this independently of the question of overlap vs. divergence, 
so long as we restrict indifference reasoning from applying across distinct Everett 
words. But it seems rather unsatisfying, and somewhat ad hoc, to simply stipulate 
such a restriction when setting out an Everettian decision theory. Do we have any 
independent reason to think that the resulting decision theory correctly models 
agents in an Everettian context? 
I have a suggestion. A judicious modification to principles connecting the 
physics of EQM with the metaphysics of modality results in a metaphysical 
picture from which a WSGM-style decision theory follows naturally. Elsewhere 
I’ve proposed the following principle: 
Individualism: Distinct Everett worlds comprise alternative 
metaphysical possibilities.  
According to Individualism, each Everett world is to be identified with a different 
metaphysically possible world. This identification fits naturally with an indexical 
conception of actuality for Everett worlds: the actual Everett world is the one in 
which we ourselves are located. The resulting picture is a form of modal realism, 
in the style of David Lewis (1986). While an Everettian modal realism would 
differ substantially from Lewisian modal realism – the possible worlds of 
Everettian modal realism would be emergent entities, would all share the same 
fundamental laws of nature, and might be neither spatio-temporally or causally 
isolated from one another16 – the views offer similarly attractive reductive stories 
                                     
16 Whether Everett worlds are spatio-temporally isolated depends on whether we adopt a 
diverging or overlapping interpretation of the quantum formalism; both interpretations are 
compatible with Individualism and with indexical actuality. It is also to possible to 
interpret EQM so that Everett worlds are causally isolated from one another, regarding the 
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about the nature of modality. However, my proposed solution to the quantum 
doomsday problem does not force us to regard EQM as a fully general theory of 
modality. The solution involves treating individual Everett worlds as alternative 
metaphysical possibilities; we can (but need not) allow in addition for the 
metaphysical possibility of some non-Everettian scenarios17. 
 As I have argued elsewhere, the combination of Individualism with an 
indexical conception of actuality helps to underwrite the WSGM decision-
theoretic treatments. Everettians can retain Huw Price’s compelling principle that 
“where goes ontology, there goes possible preference”18 (Price 2010 p.380): they 
need only interpret the principle with an implicit quantifier-restriction to the 
ontology of the actual world. For Everettians who adopt an indexical view of 
actuality, such quantifier-restriction is endemic in ordinary talk and unmysterious. 
Likewise, the indexical conception of actuality allows us to retain the related 
principle that ‘where goes actuality, there goes the epistemic possibility of self-
location’. If ‘actuality’ refers indexically to an agent’s own Everett world, then 
this principle is vindicated by the WSGM decision-theoretic frameworks. 
Uncertainty about oneʼs location within an Everett world is treated as 
uncertainty about where in the actual world one is located, while uncertainty 
about which Everett world one is in is treated as uncertainty about ordinary 
contingent matters of fact. 
Once we understand EQM along modal realist lines, Elga’s indifference 
principle still gives rise to the original doomsday effect, but it gives rise to no 
                                                                                          
dynamical connections between worlds as giving rise to non-causal explanations. (Perhaps 
phenomena in each Everett world are explained non-causally by phenomena in nearby 
worlds, in the same sort of way that the shape of a jigsaw piece is explained by the shapes 
of the surrounding pieces.) Exploring these issues must await another occasion. 
17 Adopting Individualism provides some pressure towards a principle that I have 
elsewhere called Alignment: that to be a metaphysically possible world is to be an Everett 
world. Alignment involves some controversial commitments: in particular, it entails the 
metaphysical necessity of the fundamental laws of nature. Although I find this stronger 
view plausible, the arguments of this paper do not depend on it. 
18 To provide some context for this quote: Price is here questioning the restriction in the 
WGS decision theory of an agent’s preferences to be defined only over states of the Everett 
world of which they are a part, rather than being defined over states of the whole Everett 
multiverse of which they are a part. His reasoning is that, in principle, we may assign value 
to anything at all – so long as it genuinely exists. 
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quantum doomsday effect19. If individual Everett worlds are possible worlds, then 
Elga’s indifference principle, without any need for ad hoc modification, already 
tells an agent only about how to divide credence between various locations within 
a single Everett world. In other words, a modal realist reading of EQM makes it 
possible to solve the quantitative problem with Everettian probability without 
modifying a plausible principle of classical self-locating epistemology. 
The Everettian modal realist rebuttal of the quantum doomsday 
argument applies equally to the overlapping picture and the diverging picture, 
and it thereby dissolves any methodological puzzlement elicited by the argument 
for divergence based on the quantum doomsday shift. The dialectical situation 
concerning the doomsday argument is rendered independent of the question of 
divergence vs. overlap, and confirmation theory by itself is no longer settling any 
metaphysical questions. I take this to be a very desirable result. 
7. Conclusion 
The quantum doomsday argument threatens to draw crazy confirmational 
consequences from Everettian quantum mechanics understood according to the 
overlap picture. These consequences can be avoided by switching to a diverging 
picture, but this gives rise to a further puzzle: how can a metaphysical dispute 
about the ontology of Everett worlds give rise to such a radical epistemological 
difference? 
We can now see how to resolve these puzzles. Everettian solutions to the 
quantitative problem undermine the quantum doomsday argument and thereby 
dissolve the epistemological difference between divergence and overlap. In 
addition, Everettians who supplement their solution to the quantitative problem 
with a modal realist construal of the multiverse have a satisfying response to the 
argument for divergence based on the quantum doomsday shift: they can apply 
Elga’s indifference principle in a way that avoids the quantum doomsday effect 
while recovering indifference reasoning in cases where it is intuitively plausible.  
                                     
19 The indexical conception of actuality also does not affect more familiar applications of 
Elga’s indifference principle: the principle still applies in the usual way to the Sleeping 
Beauty puzzle (Elga 2000) and to Elgaʼs duplication puzzle (Elga 2004). 
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 The treatment of Everettian probability that I have proposed involves a 
naturalistic metaphysics of modality. This approach obviously makes modal 
metaphysics hostage to empirical fortune. If it turns out that EQM is incorrect 
(perhaps some dynamical-collapse alternative to quantum theory will be 
experimentally confirmed) then we will cease to have reason to think that Everett 
worlds play the possible-world theoretical role with respect to self-locating 
indifference reasoning. This will not appeal to those metaphysicians who think 
that demarcation of modal space is philosophers’ work, and should be done a 
priori. But it ought to appeal to the growing number of more naturalistically-
oriented metaphysicians who take empirical work to be relevant to – for example 
– the metaphysics of space, time, and substance20. 
 
                                     
20 This research was supported by an Australian Research Council grant, “Neglected 
Problems of Time”, hosted at Monash University, and it was completed during a visiting 
fellowship at the Centre for Time at the University of Sydney. I am grateful for 
conversations about this material with Anthony Aguirre, Adam Bales, Sam Baron, Yann 
Benétreau-Dupin, Rachael Briggs, Adam Caulton, David Deutsch, Rohan French, Toby 
Handfield, Nick Jones, Chris Meacham, Dave Ripley, Simon Saunders, and David Wallace, 
and to audiences at Monash, Birmingham, Leeds and the BSPS. My thanks also go to 
three anonymous referees for helpful feedback.  
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